Government Estimates of Rebel Troops
In the appendix tables below, I test an alternative rebel-to-government troops measure primarily based on government sources. Table A1 lists the government information that is used for this variable. Since government estimates are missing for several years, I use Maoist sources for the initial two years and linear inter-and extrapolation for the rest. The final values are listed in the 'Mean estimate' column. Tables A2-A4 shows results from conditional logit analyses using different operationalizations of the dependent variable as well as one additional measure of relative capacity: rebel-togovernment troops based on estimates from government sources. The models of Table A2 use a slightly lower threshold for onset: 3 (instead of 5) days of insurgent killings in a half-year period.
Robustness Tests
Most of the central variable coefficients are quite similar. The largest difference is that the accessibility interactions with time and rebel-to-government troops become weaker. The interactions with rebel-to-government troops based on data from government sources (fourth column) give results very similar to the other relative capacity measures.
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In Table A3 , insurgency onset is operationalized as at the first time a district experiences at least five days of insurgent or government killings. The signs of the main variables remain similar, but results become somewhat more dependent on the relative capacity measure employed. The three first nearby insurgency interactions become even more strongly negative, whereas the interaction with the second rebel-to-government troops measure becomes slightly weaker, although still negative. For accessibility, the interactions with time and two of the relative capacity measures are clearly positive (but only significant for the last measure), whereas it is almost zero for the first rebel-to-government troops measure.
In Table A4 , insurgency onset is operationalized as at the first time a district experiences at least ten conflict-related fatalities (all victims and perpetrators included). Results for UPF support are largely similar, and strongly significant. The nearby insurgency coefficients become more strongly dependent on time and relative capacity using this onset measure. The influence of accessibility, on the other hand, becomes less consistently dependent on time and relative capacity. Two of the relative capacity interactions with accessibility are positive, as hypothesized, but one becomes negative (although not significant).
In general, these tests indicate that the contingency of UPF support and nearby insurgency on relative capacity is robust to changes in operationalization of insurgency onset and relative capacity. The influence of accessibility is consistently declining over time, but its dependency on relative capacity is somewhat less certain. Two out of the eleven estimates of interaction with relative capacity (from all tables) show no such dependency. -207.6 -211.7 -209.8 -207.6 Onset threshold: Ten conflict-related fatalities within a half-year period. Coefficients shown. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Note: For the time-varying variables, the onset operationalization in the article is used. Insurgency onset and nearby insurgency are coded for each remaining (non-failing) district at each failure date, giving 2678 observations. Stable covariates vary over districts (75) . Time (fractions of years allowed) and gov. force fatalities vary over failure times (60); and the rebel-to-government troops measures vary over years (8; the sample begins with the first onset in February 1996 and ends with the last onset in December 2004).
